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The principle of the republics of antiquity was to sacrifice private  
interests to the general good.  In that sense one could say that they 
were virtuous.  The principle of this one seems to be to make private 
interests harmonize with the general interest. A sort of refined and 
intelligent selfishness seems to be the pivot on which the whole 
machine turns. These people here do not trouble themselves to find 
out whether public virtue is good, but they do claim to prove that it is 
useful.  If this latter point is true, as I think it is in part, this society can 
pass as enlightened but not virtuous. But up to what extent can the 
two principles of individual well-being and the general good in fact be 
merged?  How far can a conscience, which one might say was based 
on reflection and calculation, master those political passions which 
are not yet born, but which certainly will be born?  This is something 
which only the future will show. 
 
    Alexis de Tocqueville, Sing-Sing, 1831 
 
In recent years, “civil society” has gained widespread appeal.  Fareed Zakaria tells us 
that, “in the world of ideas, civil society is hot.  It is almost impossible to read an article 
on foreign or domestic politics without coming across some mention of the concept.”2   
As with many such terms, however, much of its popularity is based on an elusiveness of 
meaning.   Michael Walzer’s useful distinction between thick and thin descriptions 
applies well here:  “Civil society”--like Walzer’s  “justice,” “liberty,” and “truth”-- tends to 
be a thin description in its common use,  i.e., one that operates at such a level of 
generality that it embraces  multiple meanings while simultaneously conveying minimal 
content.3   
 
                                                           
1 This essay is a substantially revised version of a paper published earlier under the title of:  “Can 
Philanthropy Solve the Problems of Civil Society?” (Indiana University Center on Philanthropy, 1995).  
2 Fareed Zakaria,  “Bigger than the Family and Smaller than the State:  Are Voluntary Groups What Makes 
Countries Work?” in New York Times Book Review, August 13, 1995, p. 1. 
3 Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (University of Notre Dame Press, 
1994) 
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My purposes here are therefore threefold:  first, to try to “thicken” the term civil society a 
bit by sketching its historical roots and conceptual structure, including the important part 
played by philanthropy in its evolution;  second, based on this analysis, to describe  a 
fundamental challenge to contemporary civil society—specifically the widening fault-line 
between its pluralistic and communal components; and third, to discuss  philanthropy’s  
difficult task in addressing this challenge.   
 
The Structure of Civil Society 
 
As I have been recently working on a book on philanthropy and civil society—viewed 
from the perspective of political theory --I have been increasingly drawn into examination 
of the historical origins of civil society.   Although the roots of civil society are ancient, it 
turns out that there was a highly dynamic period of development in the history of ideas in 
Europe—roughly in the 16th and 17th centuries—when seven elements (my argument 
seeks to make the case that the are the seven essential elements) converged in a small 
but remarkably robust country, the Dutch Republic, into what turned out to be the earliest 
modern expression of civil society.  Four of these elements are institutional—structures 
representing the rule of law, independent voluntary associations, free expression, and 
organized philanthropy; and three are normative—societal value commitments to 
individual rights, toleration, and the common good.   
 
One need only mention Grotius, Descartes, Spinoza, Bayle, Locke, and Mandeville to 
gain a sense of the intensity and excitement in the development of the new ideas that 
were transforming Europe in this period, an era that increasingly champions individual 
rights, toleration, and a new grounding of the law.   It is also the time of an explosion of 
printing, private associations, new forms of philanthropy, and the spread of republican 
ideas about achieving common purposes through decentralized power structures.  Of 
course, these transformative developments were not confined to the Dutch Republic, but 
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the Republic did serve as a kind of intellectual incubator for the emergence of what we 
have come to know as modern civil society.  
 
It is important to note that the birth of civil society occurred at the same time that a new 
political force, the absolutist state, was becoming dominant throughout Europe.   Indeed, 
many writers describe the rise of civil society as a response to absolutism. Civil society, 
as a defense of the newly emergent individual against the increasingly powerful state  
(and state-controlled church), placed new emphasis on individual rights, toleration of 
dissenting beliefs, free expression, and the proliferating private associations and 
philanthropies. Accompanying these developments was a new conception of community:  
Community was now seen as constituted through a social contract among separate self-
seeking individuals who collectively pursue common ends within a system regulated by 
law.   
 
Bernard de Mandeville’s articulation of this new understanding of society expressed the 
widely accepted view:  “the Execution of [laws] is facilitated by general Approbation, [so 
that] Multitudes may be kept in tolerable Concord among themselves.”4   Although 
Mandeville’s stark portrayal of the social order had many critics, both he and they shared 
a common view of society as composed of individuals who were in eternal competition 
for property, power, and recognition.  For those striving to comprehend the new social 
forces of the era, the overriding challenge was to discover that nature of the social glue 
that held this fissiparous world together.  Their answers were various, and the topic has 
remained a conundrum through the subsequent three centuries of development of civil 
society theory.  
 
 
While it would take many more pages to describe this historical evolution (you have to 
                                                           
4 Bernard de Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees: Or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits, in the edition edited 
by F.B. Kaye (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1924), Vol. II, p. 300. 
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read the book), I will just state the conclusions of the argument here:  that this emergent 
civil society, with its emphasis on individual rights, rule of law, pluralism, tolerance 
among diverse belief systems, and commitment to the commonweal, provided a platform 
for the evolution of liberal democracy.  Inherent in the scheme was a delicate  balance of 
public and private power—an eternally   unresolved tension between the public and 
private poles of life.  Without the institutions and norms of civil society, and its underlying 
polarity, there would be no democracy as we know it. 5  
 
If one examines the diverse views of contemporary civil society theorists through the 
framework of this historical overview,  common patterns begin to emerge. The analytical 
perspectives of writers as varied as Ralf Dahrendorf,  Adam Seligman, Charles Taylor, 
Ernest Gellner, Edward Shils, Michael Walzer, Bob Edwards, Lester Salamon, Robert 
Post, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Brian O’Connell, William Galston, John Keane, Sudipta 
Kaviraj, Sunil Khilnani, Fareed Zakaria, Kathleen McCarthy, Jean Cohen, and Andrew 
Arato consistently refer to some subset of the seven characteristics described above in 
their analyses of the constitution and role of civil society.  Collectively, these writers 
articulate a family of concepts that provide the skeletal framework of civil society. 
 
What does this framework mean for how we understand the forces shaping civil society 
today?   Among other things, it suggests that normative elements are central to civil 
society’s definition, i.e., that the value commitments to individual rights, pursuit of the 
common good, and toleration are not incidental, but rather essential , to the structure of 
civil society.  If this is true, important implications follow for our under-standing of civil 
society and the contemporary forces acting upon it.  
                                                           
5 There is an interesting parallel here (and in fact many cross-cutting influences) in the development of  
republican and liberal thought over the same time period , the past three centuries.   As Richard Dagger 
convincingly argues, the challenge was to synthesize the tradition of classical republicanism, with its 
emphasis on civic virtue, with the counterpoised tradition of individual rights that characterized political 
liberalism.  The resulting “republican liberalism” allows a blending of civic commitment and rights that 
accommodates the polarities of social life. (Civic Virtues:  Right, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism, 
Oxford University Press, 1997).  See also David Wootton, ed.,  Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial 
Society 1649-1776, Stanford University Press, 1994.   
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One of the most important consequences, for the purposes of this essay, is that the 
“lifeworld” (a very descriptive phrase used by the German philosopher Juergen 
Habermas and others before him) that we inhabit when we are acting in civil society is 
very different from those of other spheres of social life:  the economy or the state.  Each 
of these worlds has its set of goals, expectations, norms, and incentives.   In the 
economic world, we think and act as producers, consumers, and investors; in the 
political world, we play the roles of voters, lawmakers, and public administrators.     
 
In the world of civil society, we become community members, volunteers, and civic 
actors.  What particularly characterizes this world is pluralism, distinctive social values, 
and a creative tension between individual interests and the commons.  It is the sphere in 
which privatized visions of the public good play out in interaction with one another to 
shape the social agenda.  Participating in civil society involves the pursuit of a mixture of 
public and private goals, of social problem-solving and individual expression.  A phrase 
that captures it particularly well, I think, is Bob Payton’s description (referring specifically 
to philanthropy) of “voluntary action for the public good.” 
 
 
All of this is to say that participation in civil society represents not just a tool for solving 
social problems or a set of organizations (although it is those too), but rather a way of 
engaging in the world.  This way of engaging carries with it a set of values, interests, 
behaviors, and even a language.  This is why the diverse value commitments, 
processes, operating styles, and modes of participation of nonprofit organizations are 
central to their existence and not just incidental to some other over-arching goal to which 
they are “really” directed.   
 
At the core of my argument, then, lies the unique character of civil society.  Civil society 
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provides an alternative to the ways in which economic and political frameworks structure 
our world.  It is a vital alternative, because it allows for a realm of free socially connected 
action in the public realm.  But it is vulnerable to encroachment by both the state and the 
market.  The success and power of either of those other spheres can begin to 
overwhelm the rather fragile construction of civil society.  Habermas describes this as 
the “colonization of the life-world.”  In western societies today in particular, the forces of 
marketization place increasing pressure on civil society to respond to social problems in 
a fragmented bottom-line driven way.  This marketization process threatens to impose its 
own frame of reference, substituting the singular idea of return on investment for the rich 
pluralism of material, associative, aesthetic, and moral ends of civil society.  This tilt 
toward the private dimension, reinforced by a growing emphasis on rights at the expense 
of civic obligation, threatens to destabilize civil society’s delicate balance between 
individualist and communal purposes.   
 
Thus, we can look to elements within western civil society itself—market forces and the 
powerful individual rights tradition—as the primary source of a familiar institutional 
gridlock in which it becomes easy to obstruct actions for public purposes but extremely 
difficult to take positive steps forward to accomplish them.6  This gridlock does not result 
from a weakening of civil society organizations, which remain relatively healthy, but from 
rather an erosion of a set of beliefs, values, and social commitments—a civic ethos--
necessary for social cohesion. Without society-wide acceptance of the fairness and 
legitimacy of a legal system, for example, there cannot be willingness to abide by its 
outcomes; and without confidence in government’s ability to pursue policies on behalf of 
a common good, there is little inclination to support whatever is not deemed to be in the 
immediate self-interest of oneself or one’s group.   
 
                                                           
6 It has been frequently observed that opposite forces create another kind of gridlock in totalitarian systems:  
The absence of independent associational life and respect for individual rights creates  eradicates the 
legitimacy and genuine commitment to the polity that regimes so desperately seek to create. 
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Tocqueville, with his usual prescience, foresaw exactly this dilemma.   How would a 
society that turns on “a sort of refined and intelligent selfishness,” he wondered, achieve 
its goal of seeking to “make private interests harmonize with the general interest”?7  The 
difficulty is increased when the vehicle for social problem-solving is, in Tocqueville’s 
words, “a conscience . . . based on reflection and calculation,” what we might call a 
rational choice model.  If he were alive today, he would certainly not be surprised to see 
the strains within the structure of civil society and their challenging implications for the 
health of democracy.  
 
If this analysis is correct, the deterioration of a critical dimension of civil society may 
have serious consequences for the future of the liberal democratic state. While formal 
structures of democracy may remain intact, widespread public loss of commitment to the 
values upon which those structures rest suggests increasing immobility and longer term 
institutional paralysis.  Yet neither the market nor the state has the capacity to address 
this erosion of civic values because of the constraints of their own.  Can philanthropy fill 
this role? 
 
The Rise of Instrumental Philanthropy    
 
Before we can address this question, it is useful to take a brief look at the evolution of 
modern philanthropy and where it is today.  Growing out of traditions dating from 
classical and medieval times, the American philanthropic impulse was incorporated into 
the fabric of the emergent Colonial culture.  The American concept of philanthropy arose 
from the fusion of two historical currents:  a strong tradition of religious charity that 
infused the spiritual life of the colonies and a history of patronage of social advancement 
that can be traced as far back as the Greek city-state.   
 
                                                           
7 Quoted in Olivier Zunz and Alan Kahan, ed., The Tocqueville Reader:  A Life in Letters and Politics 
Blackwell Publishing, 2002) from Tocqueville’s “American Notebooks,” p. 51. 
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These traditions of religious charity and social advancement blended in pre-
Revolutionary America into a new phenomenon—voluntary giving for positive social 
purposes as a shared community value.  By the time Alexis de Tocqueville visited the 
newly formed United States, the traditions of charitable giving and informal self-help 
associations has developed into what he described as a uniquely American mixture of 
organizational life.  He marveled at the American proclivity to group together for common 
purposes: 
 
Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions constantly form 
associations. . . If it is proposed to inculcate some truth or to foster some feeling 
by the encouragement of great example, they form a society.8 
As such associations proliferated, there arose efforts to organize and monitor this sphere 
of social activity.  By the mid-19th century, the pre-Revolutionary charity societies had 
evolved into state charity commissions, and the social reformers began to direct their 
philanthropic efforts beyond the relief of the needy to address underlying causes of 
social problems.  Ultimately, the Civil War era ushered in a historically new form of 
voluntary giving for positive social purposes.  Robert Bremner notes: 
 
When charity reformers and civic leaders of the post-Civil War generation spoke 
of the arrival of a new epoch in philanthropy, they had something more 
fundamental in mind than the quantity and variety of their countrymen’s giving. . . 
What they hailed was the development of a more scientific spirit and method in 
philanthropy.  And it was the spread of this scientific approach, bringing reforms 
in public welfare and private charity, that impressed them as the great 
humanitarian achievement of their day.9 
 
This approach represented an important shift in the way charitable giving came to be 
understood and practiced.  Beginning a critical transformation of the idea of philanthropy, 
this conceptual shift moved from the traditional notion of giving by well-off individuals to 
those in need to a new notion of applying scientific principles to the advancement of 
society as a whole.  The former orientation was closely tied to the origins of philanthropy 
                                                           
8 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. II (1840), p. 106, (Knopf, 1945). 
9 Rober H. Bremner, American Philanthropy, 2nd Edition, University of Chicago Press (Chicago:1988), p. 
86 
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in religious charity and patronage by the wealthy, while the latter accompanied the 
emergence of a modern spirit of self-directed social change.  
 
At the same time, another important conceptual change was taking place in American 
culture.  During the last quarter of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, the 
Progressive Movement emerged as a powerful force shaping social consciousness.  The 
spirit of the age became increasingly egalitarian, participatory, progress-oriented, and 
scientific—in short, a newly defined sense of democracy emerged. 
 
The Progressive Movement combined faith in decentralized, popular decision-making 
with a commitment to public administration by experts.  The resulting definition of 
democracy represented, as James Morone has pointed out, an odd mix of populism and 
science, in his words, the “Progressive oxymoron—direct democracy with scientific 
administration.”10  The dualistic Progressive agenda left a strong imprint on the emerging 
liberal democratic state, which has struggled ever since to reconcile interest-group 
politics with a social engineering approach to public  policy. 
 
It is not accidental that the concept of democracy, as well as the transformed notion of 
philanthropy, began to take on new meanings during the same period in American 
history.  Previously, both words had typically been used pejoratively:  “philanthropic” to 
describe well-intentioned but naïve and possibly misguided social do-goodism (as in 
Emerson’s dismissive reference to “foolish philanthropists”) and “democratic” to describe 
a social movement driven by lower class interests, merging at its extreme into mob-
rule.11 
 
                                                           
10 James Morone, The Democratic Wish:  Popular Participation and the Limits of Government (Basic 
Books, 1990), p. 126 
11 There is a long history of the negative us of “democracy.”  See, for example, David Wootten’s 
observation in Divine Right and Democracy  (Penguin, 1986) that “Even in the late eighteenth century, the 
‘age of the democratic revolution,’ hardly anyone was willing to describe themselves as a ‘democrat,’ a 
word which is generally accepted as pejorative.” (p. 39). 
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But by the late 19th century he senses of both philanthropy and democracy were 
undergoing change as part of a broader transformation of social consciousness.  The 
newly positive connotations attached to both terms in the latter decades of the century 
contained a sense of social development and progress that presaged the emergence of 
mass democracies of the 20th century.  In the spirit of the new egalitarianism, the well-
being of the average citizen was no longer taken to be dependent on the largesse of the 
aristocracy or the charitable instincts of the well-to-do but rather supported by the 
creation of social structures through which self-help was the preferred vehicle of social 
change.  And the recently demonstrated success of science and industry only reinforced 
the growing confidence in the idea of self-directed social advancement.  
 
By the turn of the century this transformation in thinking had become widely accepted in 
the West.  The combination of self-help and scientifically directed social change was 
taken to be the modern expression of the democratic spirit.  Philanthropy could whether 
help or hinder such change, depending on how it was applied.  George Bernard Shaw’s 
Major Barbara expresses how one component of this new philosophical attitude was 
identified with the turn-of-the-century intellectual climate.  When Andrew Undershaft sets 
out to convince his daughter to leave the Salvation Army by demonstrating the 
superiority of a managed social system (never mind that it was a munitions factory) over 
the work of charitable organizations, he argues for the superiority of social engineering 
over traditional charity. 
 
What is the role for philanthropy in this emergent world of egalitarian democratic 
change?  In the view of “modern” thinkers, its primary purpose was to aid social 
advancement through assisting scientifically guided efforts at change.  Thus, the newly 
formed foundation that began to appear at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th 
centuries embodied a spirit of social experimentation and demonstration, eschewing the 
notion of relieving immediate needs in favor of creating social blueprints and replicable 
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models for larger-scale improvement.  The “scientific philanthropists” described by 
Bremner, Sealander, and others12 championed both increased efficiency in the delivery 
of services and the improvement of society as a whole through the application of better 
social mechanisms to large-scale problems. 
 
This approach was patterned on the newly demonstrated advances of 20th-century 
science and technology, and it reflected growing confidence in technical solutions to 
problems in all arenas of life.  The logic is clear:  Formulate a problem in terms of 
objectively defined criteria, establish measurable objectives, design a means to 
accomplish those objectives, and empirically assess the results.  In other words, apply 
the logic of scientific advancement to the problems of society.   
 
But the new paradigm of democratically steered and philanthropically assisted social 
engineering contained a set of assumptions that presented its own problems.  This 
paradigm rests on the presupposition that the complexities of human existence can, for 
the purposes of solving social problems, be reduced to limited categories of behavioral 
outcomes.  Like isolating disease sources in curing illnesses, the new social theory 
presumes that causes of such social ills as poverty, educational failure, and criminal 
behavior can be identified, attacked, and cured.  Or, if they cannot be completely cured, 
at least they can be mitigated through the application of palliative measures. 13  
 
Thus, much of modern philanthropy can be characterized as technical intervention in 
systems—for example, systemic change in education or improving organizational 
                                                           
12 Bremner , American Philanthropy; Judith Sealander, “Curing Evils at Their Source:  The Arrival of 
Scientific Giving” in Lawrence Friedman and Mark McGarvie, ed., Charity, Philanthropy, and Civility in 
American History (Cambridge University Press, 2003); Robert Gross, “Giving in America: From Charity to 
Philanthropy” in Charity, Philanthropy, and Civility in American History; James Allen Smith, “The 
Evolving Role of American Foundations” in Charles Clotfelter and Thomas Ehrlich, ed., Philanthropy and 
the Nonprofit Sector in a Changing America (Indiana University Press, 1999); among many others.  
13 The philosophical view that guides this form of philanthropy is closely tied to the conceptual origins of 
modern social science.  Loosely derived from a positivist theory of natural science, this view was to be 
more explicitly reflected in such later 20th-century intellectual trends as behavioralism, systems analysis, 
scientific management theories, and ethical emotivism.   
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efficiency in health-care delivery.  The aim of this intervention is to improve the operation 
of the system, increasing its efficiency or ability to attain objectively stated outcomes.  In 
this approach philanthropy shares the stance of management consulting and indeed of 
most modern professions:  Apply technical measures to clients’ problems in a way that 
addresses objective needs without intervening in the realm of beliefs or values.  The 
approach reflects the fix-it character of American social improvement—agnostic on 
values but committed to improved performance. 
 
This instrumental stance runs into limits when philanthropy encounters fundamental 
human dilemmas in which beliefs and values are central.  Just as tinkering with structure 
in unlikely to improve the results of an educational system without a change in students’ 
attitudes toward the value of education, intensifying efforts on voter registration is 
unlikely to improve the quality of public decision-making without a change in public 
attitudes toward the value of citizenship.  If philanthropy’s vocabulary is limited primarily 
to instrumental terms, it cannot reach into issue realms that are inherently ethical or 
moral.14  This poses a dilemma when philanthropy seeks to address problems rooted in 
the disintegration of social values.  The problems of civil society, reflecting weakened 
ethical and communal norms, pose just such a challenge to philanthropy. 
 
Can philanthropy fill the gap? 
 
From this description of the character of philanthropy and civil society, two fundamental 
consequences follow:   
 
1) Civil society is delicately balanced between public and private poles of action, a 
                                                           
14 In  The Idea of a Social Science (Routledge, Kegan, Paul, 1958), Peter Winch states the classical 
argument against the presumption by social science, attempting to follow the model of natural science, to 
exclude intentional (and thus moral ) language from the definition of human action.  Robert Jackall 
describes the deleterious effects on modern corporate managers of omitting moral categories from the 
worldview of “scientific management” in Moral Mazes (Oxford University Press, 1988). 
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balance that is essential to its function in liberal democracy.  At any given time, however, 
the balance can be tipped in either the statist or privatized direction. In the current 
environment, there are strong forces at work in the West threatening to tilt it toward the 
“private” side.  Philanthropy can potentially play an important role in maintaining the 
balance, but its own origins in the private sphere limit this corrective role.  
 
2) Civil society is defined, in part, by a distinctive set of values. These values are 
vulnerable to erosion by other social forces, particularly scientism and depreciation of 
the public sphere in the West in the late 20th and early 21st centuries.  Philanthropy has 
the potential to weigh in on behalf of the civic values, but it is inherently discouraged 
from doing so by its own structural limitations, particularly the instrumentalism that is a 
dominant theme of modern philanthropic practice.  
 
Contemporary philanthropy, therefore, faces a conundrum.   Because philanthropy 
performs an essential role in supporting civil society through advancing third-sector 
institutions (“society’s passing gear,” as the late Paul Ylvisaker once described it), we 
might reasonably look to it for possible solutions to the contemporary troubles of civil 
society.  Among major social institutions, philanthropy has the greatest capacity and 
freedom to direct its considerable resources toward fundamental social deficiencies of 
the type that weaken civil society.   
 
At the same time, it is very difficult for philanthropy, as currently practiced, to respond 
adequately.  The reason for this is not hard to find.  Since philanthropy is integrally 
connected to civil society through its origins and evolution, the forces that shape one 
tend to shape the other.    Thus, the growing emphasis on private means, market 
solutions, and rights agendas in civil society that hinders achievement of its communal 
aspirations is exactly the same force that shapes  philanthropic practice.   Philanthropy’s 
current fascination with the appeal of “the business model”--bottom-lines, measurable 
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outcomes, and investment-like strategies--is just one indication of this trend.15   
 
As noted above, the problem is complicated by the particular way in which modern 
philanthropy developed.  Twentieth century philanthropy has largely taken the course of 
pragmatic social improvement, adopting an instrumental stance of social engineering 
and a commitment to rights-based individualism.  While this approach can improve 
organizational operations and ameliorate specific social problems, it has great limitations 
in engaging the larger value framework within which those problems arise.   
 
Yet it is precisely this value framework that presents the deepest problem for civil 
society.  We are back to Tocqueville and his worry about reconciling the principles of 
“individual well-being and the general good” in the American experiment.    While the 
organizations that populate civil society continue to thrive (indeed the dramatic growth in 
the number of nonprofits in the United States during the past several decades would 
suggest they are flourishing),16 it is rather the erosion of essential civic values—the 
steep decline in public trust, diminishing belief in the efficacy of civic action, increasing 
fractiousness of public debate, and weakening bonds of common civic identity—that 
poses the fundamental threat.17 
 
Why then can’t philanthropy simply take on these value deficiencies as part of its overall 
social agenda?  The answer is that modern philanthropy shares its origins and 
development with civil society.   In the movement away from the paternalism of pre-
democratic societies and toward the mores of the neutral secular state,  particularly a 
                                                           
15 I discuss this trend and its consequences in greater depth in “Philanthropy’s Blindspots,” a chapter in a 
forthcoming book, Benefactors, a critique on contemporary American philanthropy (Boston: The 
Philanthropic Initiative, 2004). 
16 The explosion in numbers and revenues of the nonprofit sector during the past half century has been 
widely documented.  Michael O’Neill, for example describes a 3000% growth in the size of the sector 
during this period, with corresponding growth in revenue and assets, in Nonprofit Nation:  A New Look at 
the Third America (Jossey-Bass, 2002), p. 17. 
17 Robert Putnam and many others have described a steep decline in “social capital” over the 
past several decades.  See especially Bowling Alone:  The Collapse and Revival of American 
Community (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000). 
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state that embraces the strong influences of market-based approaches to social policy of 
the late 20th century, philanthropy has adopted a stance promoting procedural values 
and outcome-oriented intervention.  This has the positive effects of enhancing 
empowerment, consumer-responsiveness, pluralism, and focus on specific objective 
outcomes.  At the same time, however, it gives tacit preference to an 
individualist/instrumentalist over a community-based model of values and social 
organization.   
 
This model continues to influence the philanthropic enterprise as it does the larger social 
landscape.  In doing so, it has become the source of a blindspot in philanthropy in the 
arena of civic values.  Indeed, civic values rarely appear on the philanthropic horizon 
precisely because of the field’s implicit commitment to individualist values and 
instrumentalism.18  Of course this stance does not prevent philanthropy from supporting 
and strengthening other important aspects of civil society consistent with the 
management model:  the nonprofit institutional structure and individual rights.  But 
without an equal emphasis on strengthening shared norms and civic obligation, 
philanthropy is rendered incapable of addressing some of the most critical problems of 
civil society.   
 
How might philanthropy take on the civic values agenda without lapsing into traditional 
paternalism or the imposition of narrowly ideological views on grant recipients?  Here 
philanthropy might take a cue from the resurgence of interest in the concept of 
citizenship among writers across the political spectrum throughout the world.  According 
to Kymlicka and Norman, “there is growing fear that the civility and public-spiritedness of 
                                                           
18 A number of writers have discussed the potentially corrosive impact of marketization on civil society, 
among them Charles Lindblom, Ralf Dahrendorf, Robert Bellah, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Fareed Zakaria, and 
E.J. Dionne.   Most analysts see the relationship as ambiguous, because market values also  reinforce  the 
pluralism and voluntarism  that are essential to civil society.   I have also discussed this relationship in a 
lecture, “If Pigs Had Wings:  The Appeals and Limits of Venture Philanthropy,” delivered in the Waldemar 
Nielsen Issues in Philanthropy Seminar Series, Georgetown University, 2001.  My focus here, however, is 
primarily on the instrumentalist rather than the individualist bias in contemporary philanthropy. 
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citizens in liberal democracies is in serious decline,” and they observe that this concern 
has been sparked by worldwide phenomena ranging from voter apathy to crises in 
multicultural and multiracial societies: 
  
These events have made clear that the health and stability of a modern 
democracy depends, not only on the justice of its “basic structure” but also on the 
qualities and attitudes of its citizens:  for example, their sense of identity and how 
they view potentially competing forms of national, regional, ethnic, or religious 
identities; their ability to tolerate and work together with others who are different 
from themselves; their desire to participate in the political process in order to 
promote the public good and hold political authorities accountable; their 
willingness to show restraint and exercise personal responsibility in their 
economic demands and in personal choices which affect their health and the 
environment.19 
 
In light of a past over-emphasis on structures and institutions, they note that 
contemporary writers are focusing attention on two primary issues:  civic virtues and 
citizenship identity. 
 
By explicitly taking on such topics as civic virtue and citizenship identity, philanthropy 
could directly address issues that are at stake in the crisis of civil society.  To do so, 
however, it would have to overcome the conceptual limitations of its individualist and 
instrumentalist stance.  There are many granting areas where a civic values agenda 
would make a strong impact, most prominently education, but also community service, 
media projects, and civic participation components of a wide range of other third-sector 
activities.  Civic education could encompass but also move considerably beyond existing 
voter registration and empowerment agendas to include issues of civic identity, the 
balance of rights and responsibilities, and commitment to principles of civil society. 
 
Such a move would require foundations not only to change ordinary operating 
assumptions but also to address the limitations of a culture of increasing managerialism.  
Through the application of technical means to achieve specified results, managerialism 
                                                           
19 Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, “Return of the Citizen:  A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship 
Theory,” in Ethics, v. 104, n. 2 (January, 1994), pp. 353 and 360. 
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meets its limits in attempting to comprehend and address issues not amenable to 
technical solutions.  Just as healthcare professionals have encountered the 
shortcomings of the medical model, philanthropic professionals are severely hampered 
by instrumentalism in their attempts to address complex social problems. 
 
To move beyond the instrumentalist stance, foundations would have to extend beyond 
their commonly stated (and laudable) objectives of building models, leveraging 
resources, creating partnerships, supporting leadership, and even improving the quality 
of life, promoting distributive justice, expanding life opportunities, and protecting 
individual rights.  They would have to add the goal of promoting the values of citizenship 
and civic obligation and to support activities directed toward strengthening the character 
and cohesiveness of civic life.  The results of such funding would have to be judged as 
much in terms of the quality of public discourse it promoted as the objective measures of 
numbers reached and action steps taken.  It would, in a word, incorporate the values of 
civil society into the business of philanthropy. 
